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INDIAN COAL AUTHORITIES: THE CONCEPT OF
FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND INDEPENDENT
TRIBAL COAL DEVELOPMENT ON THE
NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS

I. INTRODUCTION
The Indian tribes of the Northern Great Plains are confronted
by full-scale coal development on their reservations. The tribes presently faced with this prospect are the Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Ft. Berthold Reservation, the Northern Cheyenne and Crow Tribes,
and the Affiliated Tribes of the Ft. Peck Reservation.1 The impact
of this prospective development on the economic status of these Indian reservations has not yet been fully realized. 2 Like Indians everywhere, these tribes suffer from inadequate education, massive unemployment, sub-standard housing and poor health care.3
Federal statutes and regulations which control reservation mineral
development address only one form of coal development, that of leasing.4 Congress and the Department of the Interior have encouraged
* The author wishes to acknowledge Thomas J. Lynaugh, General Counsel for the
Crow Tribe of Indians, for his assistance in the preparation of this Note.
1. The Three Affiliated Tribes of the Ft. Berthold Reservation are located in western
North Dakota. This reservation encompasses about 418,556 acres of land of which approximately 57,945 is tribally owned, 360,438 acres is individually owned, and, 164, acres
is owned by the United States. Total enrolled membership of the Three Affiliated Tribes
is 5,806 persons. Statistics from Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau Area Office, Aberdeen,
S.D. (Nov. 1976).
The Northern Cheyenne and Crow Tribes occupy adjoining reservations in southeastern Montana. The Northern Cheyenne Reservation encompasses about 440,223 acres of
land of which approximately 269,000 acres is tribally owned, 164,000' acres is individually
owned and 6,800 acres is owned by the United States for school and administrative purposes. Enrolled membership in the Northern Cheyenne Tribe Is 2,926 persons. The Crow
Reservation totals about 1,558,059 acres of land of which approximately 340,000 is tribally
owned, 1,215,000 acres is individually owned and 1,400 acres is owned by the United States
for school and administrative purposes. Enrolled membership in the Crow Tribe is approximately 4,300 persons. K. Ross TOOLE, THE RAPE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, 44-45 (176)..
The Ft. Peck Indian Reservation is located in northcentral Montana and occupies
1,701,597 acres of land of which 182,819 acres is tribally owned), 1,432,183 acres is allotted
and 86,595 acres is held by the United States for school and administrative purposes. Enrolled membership of the tribe totals 7,687. Statistics from Bureau of Indian Affairs, Billings Area Office, Billings, Mont. (Feb. 1977).
2. To date there has not been a thorough coal Inventory of any one of these reservations. The Crow Tribe, however, is presently mining four million tons of coal per year at
the Sarpy Creek mine located outside of the reservation under a lease of 30,876.25 acres,
negotiated with Westmoreland Resources. Inc., in 1972. Office of Coal Research, Crow
Reservation, Crow Agency, Mont., Info. Sheet No. 2-75 (Apr. 25, 1975). The Ft. Peck
Reservation has not negotiated leases or exploration permits but has plans to develop Its
coal resources. Telephone conversation with Marvin Sonosky, Tribal Attorney, Ft. Peck
Reservation, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 17, 1976). The Northern Cheyenne Tribe and the
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Ft. Berthold Reservation have not re-negotiated their coal
leases, which were recently reduced In acreage and made subject to administrative appeal
by the Department of the Interior. See note 11 infra.
3. See The American Indian-Message from the President of the United Staltes, 114
CoNG. REC. 5517-21 (1968).
4. See, e.g., Omnibus Tribal Leasing Act of May 11, 1938, Pub. L .No. 75-506, ch. 198,
52 Stat. 347 (current version in 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1970)). For a general discussion
of federal mineral leasing policy on Indian lands, see Council on Econ. Priorities, Leased
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the tribes of the Northern Great Plains to lease large tracts of reservation land for coal development. Although the federal leasing policy has benefited the tribes,5 their interests have not always been
well protected.6 For instance, the Secretary of the Interior, in implementing government policy toward tribal coal development, has
been faced with a conflict of interests in recent years. On the one
hand, the Department of the Interior has the responsibility to guide
the tribes in the use of their lands, and on the other hand, it has
the responsibility to promote the orderly and timely development of
natural resources." In zealous attempts to promote development of
reservation "black gold", the Secretary has largely ignored his responsibility to consider "cultural continuity, tribal survival, [and]
the integrity of the land surface." 9 This situation partly stems from
the fact that the Department of the Interior has "no clear directive
to follow" 10 when conflicts in these responsibilities arise. Naturally,
this conflict in the dual responsibilities of the Department of the Interior has affected its treatment of Indian coal leases.
As a result, the tribes have begun to take a closer look at their
control over coal development. As a first step toward achieving greater control over coal development, the Northern Cheyenne and Crow
Tribes have completed and the Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berand Lost: A Study of Public and Indian Coal Leasing in 'the West, 5 EcoN. PRIORITIEs REP.
at 30-35 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Leased and Lost].
The Department of the Interior has recently proposed revisions for its regulations
governing the mineral development of Indian lands. If these revisions are adopted, by the
Department of the Interior, mineral development on Indian lands would not be limited to
leasing, because "the proposed revision recognizes the authority of Indian mineral industry
to develop their natural resources, and to enter into any lawful contractual arrangement
which will further that goal ..
" 42 Fed. Reg. 18,083 (Apr. 5, 1977). The changes proposed by 42 Fed. Reg. 18,083 (Apr. 5, 1977) include revisions or revocations of 25 C.F.R.
Parts 171-73. 177, 182-83 (1976).
5. Leasing has benefited the tribes \by providing employment and ready income In the
form of royalties. For example, the Sarpy Creek Mine on the Crow Reservation in Montana presently. employs 65 members of the Crow Tribe. Statistics from Bureau of Indian
Affairs, Billings Area Office, Billings, Mont. (1976). For a discussion of Indian mineral
lease provisions concerning rents and royalties, see Leased and Lost, supra note 4, at 33.
6. For example, in a Petition to Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton on January 9, 1974, the Northern Cheyenne Tribe charged the Secretary with wholesale violations
of federal regulations as applied to permits and leases covering 214,000 acres, the equivalent of approximately one-half of the reservation. Among the allegations were: failure to
require an environmental impact statement as provided by 25 C.F.R. Part 177 (1974) ; failure to provide a technical examination of prospective surface exploration and mining operations under 25 C.F.R. § 177.4(a) (1) (1974); and issuance of permits and leases in excess
of the maximum acreage limitation as provided by 25 C.F.R. § 171.9(b) (1) (1974).
7. To facilitate leasing, the Secretary of the Interior has been delegated broad discretion by Congress as trustee of the Indian tribes. As an example of the Secretary's broad
discretion section 2 of the Omnibus Tribal Leasing Act of May 11, 1938 grants to the
Secretary ample authority to prescribe terms and conditions of lease sales, to reject all
bids, and to accept less than the highest bid if he determines it to be in the best interest
of the tribe. Omnibus Tribal Leasing Act of May 11, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-506, ch. 198, §
2, 52 Stat. 347, 347 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 396(b) (1970)).
The Department of the Interior has stated: " 'The principal goal of the Department
in regard to the development of minerals on Indian land is to assist the Indian landowners
in deriving the maximum economic benefits from their resources consistent with sound
conservation practices and environmental protection.' " Leased and Lost, supra note 4, at 31.
8. Leased and Lost, supra note 4, at 33.
9. Id. at 31.
10. Id. at 33.
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thold are in the process of obtaining invalidation of their coal leases
and permits. 1 At the same time, the tribes are also considering alternatives to replace leasing that would effectively shift responsibility for mineral development from the federal government to the
tribes. For the tribes, any feasible alternative must safeguard cultural and tribal unity and utilize coal to increase the economic basils of the reservations. One alternative that the tribes are seriously
12
considering is the creation of a tribal coal authority.
This note will present an analysis of whether federal law applicable to coal development permits the use of an independent coal
authority."3 Accordingly, this note will first define the concept of a
tribal coal authority and then survey the existing tribal constitutions
and charters to determine whether they authorize the creation of
such an entity. Because of the federal government's relationship to
the Indian tribes and its preference for leasing as a method of coal
development, the concept of federal preemption and the congressional intent of the leasing statutes regarding reservation lands will be
reviewed to determine whether a tribe has the authority to use a
method other than leasing for coal development. Finally, this note
will explore federal law, in particular the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934,' 4 to ascertain whether an Indian tribe has the power to
form a corporate entity such as a coal authority.
II. DEFINITION OF A TRIBAL COAL AUTHORITY
It is important to discuss briefly the concept of a tribal coal
authority in order to understand fully its functions and advantages
over the traditional form of mineral leasing 'on the reservations. The
following discussion will focus upon the governmental and corporate
11. See Decision of the Secretary of the Interior, Thomas S. Kleppe, Relating to Crow
Tribe v. Kleppe (Jan. 13, 1977) ; Decision of the Secretary of the Interior, Rogers C. B.
Morton., on the Northern Cheyenne Petition (June 4, 1974) ; letter from Anson A. Baker,
Superintendent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Ft.
Berthold Reservation, to Consolidation Coal Co. (Aug. 29, 1975) (on file with the North
Dakota Law Review).

12. A tribe that chooses to adopt an independent approach to coal development undoubtedly will have to face a bureaucratic impasse. Within the Bureau of Indian Affairs
there is generally
[a] lack of expertise . . . in dealing with new forms of development; that is,
if a tribe proposes anything outside the scope of the standard lease agreement, there Is no one who can deal with it. Consequently, the burden of
selling a

new idea is

always on the tribe which

often lacks the experience,

expertise and the dollars to fight the bureaucracy of agency, area and national offices. Since the likelihood of having the expertise needed is less at
the lower levels, agency and area offices often act as stunbling blocks either
out of fear of change or out of the lack of knowledge.
Americans for Indian Opportunity (AIO), A Question of Power: Indian Control of Indian
Resource Development 8 (1976) (compiled from conference on Indian Tribes as Developing
Nations held in Racine, Wis., Sept. 21-23, 1975) [hereinafter cited as AIO Report].
13. For a discussion of independent tribal mineral development, see Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism, in RocKy MTN. MiN. L. FOUND., INSTITUTE ON INDIAN
LAND DEVELOPMENT-OIL, GAS, COAL AND OTHER MINERALS, paper 10 art 29 (Apr. 1976).
14. Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (current version In

25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1970)).
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powers which might be possessed by a tribal coal authority and the
possible implementation of these powers under a contract mining
structure negotiated with a mining company for purposes of tribal
coal development. 5
A. GOVERNMENTAL AND CORPORATE POWERS

The concept of a tribal coal authority is patterned after the general model utilized in federal and state governments such as the Tennessee Valley Authority 16 and the Port of New York Authority."7 A
tribal coal authority would be a proprietorship possessing the char18
acteristics of both a private corporation and a government agency.
Although its functions may be different among the reservations, a
tribal coal authority basically would include the following: perpetual
corporate existence; the power to negotiate contracts; adoption of a
corporate seal; the power to hold real and personal property; 19 the
capacity to sue and be sued; 20 and the authority to employ its own
personnel. 2" As a quasi-political entity, a coal authority would
be endowed with certain governmental powers. Among these powers
would be the authority to construct tribal facilities for use in coal
development, 2 2 the capacity to provide police protection,' 3 and im24
plementation of a reservation mineral inventory.
Use of a tribal authority for coal development has distinct advan15. Discussion of a coal authority will be based primarily on the concept to be utilized
by the Crow Tribe, which enacted a resolution providing for creation of a coal authority
In 1976. (resolution on file with the North Dakota Law Review).
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 831a-831dd (1970), as amended.
17. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 32:1 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1976).
18. As with any public corporation created by statute, the scope and powers of an authority would necessarily depend upon its enabling legislation and the tribal constitution and
corporate charter's limitations upon its functions. See Note, The Legal Nature of Public
Purpose Authorities: Governmental, Private, or Neither? 8 GA. L. REv. 680 (1974). See
also Comment, An Analtysis of Authorities: Traditional and Mnlticounty, 71 MICH. L. RLv.
1376 (1973). For an Indian law case dealing with this principle, see Quichan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976).
19. E.g., the enabling legislation of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 16 U.S.C. § 831c
(1970), as amended, (Supp. II 1972) provides In part as follows:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, the Corporation
(a)- Shall have succession in its corporate name.
(b) May sue and be sued in its corporate name.
(c) May adopt and use a corporate seal, which shall be judicially noticed.
(d) May make contracts, as herein authorized.
(e) May adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws.
(f) May purchase or lease and hold such real and personal property as
it deems necessary or convenient in the transaction of its business, and
may dispose of any such personal property held by it....
(g) Shall have such powers as may be necessary or appropriate for the
exercise of the powers herein specifically conferred upon the Corporation ...
20. For a discussion of tribal consent to be sued, see note 50 infra.
21. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 831b (1970), as amended, (Supp. II 1972) (Tennessee Valley Authority).
22. The power to construct facilities for coal development would either be expressly
granted to the coal authority by its charter or would be implied through a "necessary and
proper" clause in the coal authority's enabling legislation. See Note, supra note 18, at 683.
23. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:2-25 (1963) (Port of New York Authority in New Jersey).
21. A reservation mineral authority could be undertaken by the tribal coal authority or
the authority could be empowered to hire outside expertise for this purpose.. See generatUi
AIO Report supra note 12, at 24.
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tages over a government agency created for the same purpose. Governmental authorities are generally assigned a single responsibility 25
when created and are delegated broad discretion over employment,
salaries to be paid, and administrative organization, subject to general procedures promulgated in the enabling legislation. 26 Separated
from the rest of the government infra-structure, decision-making
within the tribal coal authority would be centralized solely in the
management of an elected or appointed board of directors, free from
the "inflexible bureaucratic rules and procedures ' ' 27 applicable to
other divisions of government. The adoption of a tribal authority
would insulate the negotiation of business arrangements, so essential
to coal development, from tribal politics. 2 A stable policy toward
coal development within the reservation is critical to the development of a viable long-term mining program for both the tribe and
29
third parties who have contracted to mine or sell the coal.
B.

SERVICE

CONTRACT STRUCTURE

Because the tribes have limited management expertise and capacity, 30 a tribal coal authority would undoubtedly have to negotiate
a service contract with a mining company. Under this type of contract, a mining company would be hired to mine tribal coal for a
fee based upon a fixed price per ton mined, a percentage of the profits, a fixed price with added incentives, or a combination of these
methods of compensation." The company's contribution under a service contract would be its management capability over mining operations. Although these operations would be subject to the overall direction of the tribal coal authority, the basic duties of the company
would probably include the following: an evaluation of coal reserves
and the preparation of mining and economic feasibility plans for mine
25.

An

authority, "unlike

a

general

governmental

unit, usually

has only

a

single re-

sponsibility so that those in positions of control can concentrate on the single project,
thereby developing a certain expertise in the area and improving the efficiency of operation." Note, supra note 18, at 688.
26. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 831b (1970), as amended, (Supp. II 1972), providing for the employment and salaries of the Tennessee Valley Authority, provides in part as follows:
The board shall without regard to the provisions of the Civil Service laws

* ' *
appoint such managers, assistant managers, officers, employees, attorneys, and agents, as are necessary for the transaction of its business,
fix their compensation, define their duties, require bonds of such of them
27.

as the board may designate, and provide a
.responsibility and oromote efficiency....
Note, supra note 18, at 688.

28.

If

system of

organization

to fix

an Indian tribe suffers from substantial internal dissension, a company would

probably look for a higher rate of return under its mining contract because of the overal
unpredictability of the long-term investment. AIO Report, supra note 12, at 28. One of the
advantages of authorities generally is that the bulk of decisions are to be made without
partisan considerations. See Note, supra note 18, at 689.
29. See AIO Report, supra note 12, at 13.
30. AIO Report, supra note 12, at 30.
31. Id. at 26. See "Forms of Agreement," Interregional Workshop on Negotiation and
Drafting of Mining Development Agreements, Buenos Aires, Argentina (Nov. 1973) (pre-

pared by C. J. Lipton, Interregional Advisor, United Nations Secretariat).
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facilities;3

2

observance of applicable federal reclamation laws; 33 oper-

ation and maintenance of mine facilities in a prudent manner; 34 the
supply of all equipment, machinery and facilities as provided by the
contract;35 payment 'of North Dakota and Montana severance taxes,
if applicable; 6 and the hiring and training of tribal members for po37
sitions in the mine work force.

On the other hand, the service contract would require the tribal
coal authority to do the following: cooperate in securing government
exploration permits; 38 construct mine facilities and supply equipment;
approve exploration, development, mining, reclamation and economic
feasibility plans; 39 and inspect all mine facilities and reclamation activities. A tribal coal authority would retain the option of selling the
coal directly to power companies or granting an exclusive right to sell40
the coal to the development company under the service contract.
As another alternative, a tribal authority could hire a separate sales
concern for this purpose. 41 Under any of these options, a tribe may
realize a significantly higher return than is presently derived from
leasing. 42 The tribal coal authority may also be responsible for pro32. AIO Report, supranote 12, at 28.
33. See 25 C.F.R. Part 177 (1976).
34. Leasing provisions relating to efficient and prudent operations are presently included in all of the standn.rd mineral' lease forms of the Department of the Interior. See,
e.g., Ch. IV, § 3, Amended Coal Mining Lease, Tract 3, Sale 1, Westmoreland-Crow Lease
(Nov. 24, 1974).
35. The duty to supply equipment and facilities for coal development would be subject
to negotiation. The tribe would have to decide whether to commit itself to this large capital investment or to compensate the company for investment in these assets.
36. It Is unclear to what extent a company that is engaged by a coal authority to mine
Indian coal would be subject to state severance taxes. The authority to tax Indian coal
that Is leased for mining purposes is granted to the states by 25 U.S.C. § 398c (1970).
This section speaks of leases only and may not be applicable to coal development undertaken by a tribal coal authority that employs a mining company under a service contract.
The issue of state taxation of tribal minerals removed pursuant to a service contract
may have to be resolved by the courts. If the recent United States Supreme Court decisions of Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); McClannahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164
(1973); and Kennerly v. Distriet Court of Mont., 400 U.S. 423 (1971) are followed, It
is doubtful whether a state severance tax would be sustained. It has been the trend of
the Supreme Court in these cases to support a concept of strong economic self-determination for the tribes, especially if a state law would encroach upon an existing tribal ordinance enacted for the same purpose.
A resolution for a severance tax of 25% of'the market price per ton of coal mined
on the Crow Reservation was passed by the Tribal Council on Jan. 31, 1976 and approved
by the Secretary of the Interior on Jan. 17, 1977. Information obtained from the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, Billings Area Office, Billings, Mont. The issue of Montana's application
of its severance tax to Crow coal reserves will probably be litigated in the near future.
37. Preferential employment provisions are presently contained in most Indian mineral
lease forms furnished by the Department of the Interior although they are not required
by statute or federal regulations. See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N,
MINERAL LEASING INDIAN LANDS 27 (Oct. 1975).
38. See 25 C.F.R. § 171.27a (1976).
39. Under a service mining contract such approval would be necessary for the tribal
coal authority in order to maintain adequate control. See generally AIO Report, supra
note 12, at 26.
40. The method utilized by a tribal coal authority for the sale of Indian coal would
undoubtedly be subject to negotiation. The method adopted would, however, ultimately
depend upon the projected highest return to the tribe on its investment.
41. A tribe would have the option of employing a company which specializes in the sale
of mineral commodities and compensating the company on a fixed commssion based on
sales.
42. Under most of the present coal leases, tribes receive a fixed royalty without regard
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viding the capital necessary in coal development. The necessary longterm financing could be obtained from customers whose benefit would
be a reduced sales price, or from lending institutions and federal
43
programs.
III. TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO A COAL AUTHORITY.
Under the constitutions4 4 and charters 45 of the tribes of the Northern Great Plains facing potential coal development, the power to
create a corporate entity such as a tribal coal authority is generally provided. The Three Affiliated Tribes of the Ft. Berthold Reservation and the Northern Cheyenne Tribe both obtained their constitutions and charters pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934.46 The purposes of this Act were to insure to the tribes that
came under its provisions a firm degree of economic independence
and to clarify pre-existing powers and duties of the tribal governments .47 The corporate powers of these two tribes are substantially
identical. For example, the constitution of the Ft. Berthold Reservation grants the Tribal Business Council the power to delegate the
authority "[t]o manage all economic affairs and enterprises of
the Three Affiliated Tribes . . . in accordance with the terms of
[the tribal charter] ." 4 The corporate charters of both tribes complement this general constitutional mandate by conferring additional

powers to adopt and use a corporate seal,49 to sue and to be sued, 50
to the quality or sulphur content of the coal mined or the optimum market price. Under
a service contract, the tribe's return would be directly related to the market price per ton
of coal mined. AIO Report, supra note 12, at 22.
43. One federal source of funding that a tribe could utilize to obtain investment capital
is the Indian Business Development Program. See 25 C.F.R. Part 80 (1976). Over a long
period of time, revenues could then be applied to decrease corporate debt, while the coal
resources would provide collateral for expansion of the enterprise.
44. CONST. & BYLAWS OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FT. BERTHOLD RESERVATION, N.D., adopted May 15, 1936 and approved by the Sec. of the Interior, June 3, 1936;
CONST. & BYLAWS OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE INDIAN
RESERVATION, MONT., adopted Nov. 2, 1935 and approved by the Sec. of the Interior, Nov.
23, 1935; CONST. & BYLAWS OF THE CROW TRIBAL COUNCIL, MONT., adopted June 24, 1948
and approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May "23, 1949, as amended, Dec. 18,
1961; CONST. & BYLAWS OF THE ASSINIBOINE AND Sioux TRIBES OF THE FT. PECK INDIAN
RESERVATION, MONT., as amended, approved effective Oct. 1, 1960.
45. CORPORATE CHARTER OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FT. 3ERTHOLD RESERVATION, N.D., ratified Apr. 24, 1937; CORPORATE CHARTER OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE
TRIBE OF THE TONGUE RIVER RESERVATION, MONT., ratified Nov. 7, 1936.
46, Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (Ilrrent version in
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1970)). The constitutions and corporate charters of the Three Affiliated Tribes and the Northern Cheyenne Tribe grant substantially identical powers and
duties to the respective tribal councils.
47. See discussion at text accompanying note 174 infra.
48. CONST. OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FT. BERTHOLD RESERVATION, N.D.,
art. VI, § 5(a). Delegation of corporate functions to a coal authority would be subject to
the popular referendum procedures in art. VIII of the tribal constitution. See also CONST.
OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE INDIAN RESERVATIONW,
MONT., art. IV, § 1(e) and art. IV, § 1(n).
49. CORPORATE CHARTER OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FT. BERTHOLD RESERVATION, N.D. § 5(a). See also CORPORATE CHARTER OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE OF
THE TONGUE RIVER RESERVATION, MONT. § 5 (a).
50. CORPORATE CHARTER OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE OF THE TONGUE RIVER RES-
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and to purchase, hold, operate and dispose of property of every description.5 1 In the exercise of their corporate functions, the tribes
are also guaranteed the freedom to engage in any business that will
further the economic well-being of their reservations and to negotiate any contracts or agreements to carry out the tribes' corporate
functions.

52

MONT. § 5(h)
: CORPORATE CHARTER OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF' THE FT.
BERTHOLD RESERVATION, N.D. § 5 (i).
It is unclear to what extent tribal waiver of immunity from suit subjects the tribe
to litigation. It Is generally agreed', however, that Indian tribes, as quasi-sovereign states,
may not be sued absent the consent of Congress. See, e.o., United States v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940): Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma, 461 F.2d 674
(10th Ctr. 1972), cerf. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972).
Under both charters, the waiver of immunity from suit is qualified by the following phrase:
[Blut the grant or exercise of such power to sue and to be sued shall not
be deemed a consent by the said Tribe or by the United States to the levy of
any Judgment, lien or attachment upon the property of the Tribe other than
income or chattels specifically nledged or assigned.
ERVATION,

CORPORATE

CHARTER OF THE NORTHERN

CHEYENNE TRIBE OF THE TONGUE FEVER RESERVA-

TION, MONT. § 5(h). See also CORPORATE CHARTER OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF4THE
FT. BERTHOLD RESERVATION, N.D. § 5(i).
Nearly all the courts that have reached the question have ruled that such a provision constitutes a waiver. E.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Citizens National Bank, 361 F.2d
517 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Enterprise Elec. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 353 F. Supp. 991,
992 (D. Mont. 1973).
Constitutions of tribes not organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (current version in 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1970)),
such as the Crow and' the Tribes of Ft. Peck, do not contain provisions granting a waiver
and thus would be immune from suit.
51. CORPORATE CHARTER OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FT. BERTHOLD RESERVATION,

N.D.

§ 5(b);

CORPORATE

CHARTER

OF THE

NORTHERN

CHEYENNE

TRIBE OF

THE

TONGUE RIVER RESERVATION, MONT. § 5(b). Under both tribal charters, management and
ownership of property is subject to the following restrictions:
(1) No sale or mortgage may be made by the Tribe of any land, Or interests
in land, including water power sites, water rights, oil, gas, and other mineral rights, now or hereafter held by the Tribe....
(2) No mortgage may be made by the Tribe of any standing timber on any
land ....
(3) No leases, permits . . . or timber sale contracts covering any land or
interests in land now or hereafter held by the Tribe . . . shall be made by
the Tribe for a longer term than five years. . . , and all such leases, permits
or contracts must be approved by the Secretary of the Interior or by his duly
authorized representative....
(4) No action shall be taken by or In,behalf of the Tribe which in any way
operates to destroy or injure the tribal grazing lands, timber, or other natural
resources. . . . All leases, permits and timber sale contracts relating to the
use of tribal grazing or timber lands shall conform to regulations of the
Secretary of the Interior authorized by Section 6 of the Act of June 18,
1934, with respect to range carrying capacity, sustained yield forestry management, and other matters therein specified. Conformity to such regulations shall be made a condition of any such lease, permit, or timber sale
contract, whether or -not such agreement requires the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, and violation of such condition shall render the agreement revocable, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior.

CORPORATE CHARTER OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE OF THE TONGUE RIVER RESERVATION,
MONT. § 5(b) (1)-(4). See also CORPORATE CHARTER OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF

THE FrT. BERTHOLD RESERVATION, N.D. § 5(b) (1)-(3).

-

52. CORPORATE CHARTER OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FT. BERTHOLD RESEG1VATION, N.D. § 5(f) provides the tribe with the authority to do the following:
To make and perform contracts and agreements of every description, not
inconsistent with law or with any provisions of this Charter, with any person, association, or corporation, with any municipality or any county, or

with the United States or the State of North Dakota including agreements
with the State of North Dakota for the rendition of public services; Provided, that any contract involving payment of money by the corporation in
excess of $50,000 in any 1 fiscal year shall be subject to the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior or his duly authorized representative.
See also CORPORATE

CHARTER OF THE NORTHERN

CHEYENNE TRIBE OF THE TONGUE RIVER

NOTES

The Crow constitution provides that the tribe, through its Tribal
Council, "shall 'have power to establish, own, operate, maintain and
engage in any business or business enterprise, either as sole owner
and operator, or jointly with any person, firm, or corporation, or
jointly with any agency or department of the Government of the
United States. . . -53 The constitution of the Assiniboine and Sioux
Tribes of the Ft. Peck Reservation confers upon the Tribal Executive Board the ability to engage in businesses "designed for the
economic advancement of the people. ' 54 To be effective under the
Ft. Peck constitution, a delegation of corporate functions by the Executive Board to a coal authority would have to be ratified by a
duly enacted resolution or ordinance. 55
Although the tribes of the Northern Great Plains faced with the
prospect of coal development possess the authority to incorporate, that
authority is,a limited one. The constitutions of all four of the tribes
of the Northern Great Plains considering coal development recognize the paramount authority of the United States over tribal
affairs and property.58 The scope of a tribal coal authority's mandate will thus ultimately depend upon the amount of federal control
exerted over its functions.
IV. FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN RESERVATIONS
A.

THE HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION

The federal government is vested with plenary power over Indian
affairs and tribal property.5 7 The commerce clause of Article I of
the United States Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have
0
RESERVATION, MONT. § 5(e).
53. CONST. OF THE CROW TRIBAL COUNCIL, MONT. art. IX,
54.

CONST.

OF THE ASSINIOINE

§ 1.

AND SIoux TRIBES OF THE FT. PECK INDIAN

RESERVATION,

MONT. art. X, § 5.
55. Id. art. VII, § 8.
56.

E.g., CONST. OF THE CROW TRIBAL COUNCIL, MONT. art. VII, § 4 provides as follows:
Subject to existing federal law which endows the Congress with plenary
powers over the Indians in their tribal state, and which In turn passes such

authorities down the line to the Secretary of Interior and the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, who by regulations based upon acts of the Congress, control the management of Indian Affairs subject to constitutional limitations.
The Crow Tribal Council. without legal status as such, but being the mouth-

piece and the voice of the Crow people, will from time to time call to the
attention of the Congress its views and wishes with respect to the administration of its rights, property and affairs by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
See also id. art. VII, § 5.
CONST.

OF

THE THREE

AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FT. BERTHOLD RESERVATION,

N.D.

art. VI. § 2 also provides as follows :

The exercise of the powers enumerated in this Constitution is subject to any

57.

limitations imposed by the statutes of the United States or the Constitution
of the United States, and to all express restrictions upon such powers contained in this Constitution and Bylaws.
The authority of the federal government over Indian tribes is firmly embedded' in

caselaw. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 706 (1943); Sunderland
v. United States, 266 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1924); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,
566-68 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 653-54 (1890) ;
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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Power... [tio regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
...
5 In addition,
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.
Article IV vests Congress with the "[p]ower to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States . -."9 Congressional
control over Indian affairs and property is supplemented by the
60
treaty-making powers of the Executive branch.
As early as the first half of the nineteenth century, it was settled by judicial decision that the title interest in reservation lands
is held by the United States." The interest retained by the tribe
is possessory, an undisturbed use and occupancy,6 2 which can be
terminated only by Congress.6 3 Consequently, it has been held that
Congress cannot transfer more than naked fee title to reservation
lands,6 4 and that lands set aside by treaty cannot be appropriated
by the United States without payment of just compensation. 5 This
peculiar right of enjoyment possessed by the tribes over reservation

lands usually includes the minerals lying beneath the land. Where
tribal rights arise from aboriginal possession safeguarded by treaty
or statute, those rights extend to the minerals, even if the document
does not expressly include them.6 In United States v. Shoshone Tribe
of Indians, the United States Supreme Court stated that "the United
States granted and assured to the tribe peaceful and unqualified possession of the land in perpetuity. Minerals and standing timber are
"58.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

59. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
60. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 provides as follows: "[The President] shall have Power, by and
with the advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties..." Congress discontinued treatsmaking with Indians by the Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566
which stated as follows: "That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of
the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or
power with whom the United States may contract by treaty ..
" Executive agreements
were substituted as a means of dealing with the Indian tribes. Such agreements differed
from treaties only in the respect that they had to be ratified by both houses of Congress
rather than solely by the Senate. F.

COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 67

(1958

ed.).
61. The Idea that full legal title vested in the United States with a lesser possessory
right In the Indian tribes is derived from Chief Justice John Marshall's concept of "title
by discovery," articulated in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543, 574 (1823). "[The Indians'] rights to complete sovereignty as independent nations
were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
62. 34 Op. ATTY. GEN. 171, 176 (1924).
63. Id. at 180 states in part as follows: [T]he Indian possession has always been recognized
as complete and exclusive until terminated by conquest or treaty, or by the exercise of that
plenary power of guardianship to dispose of tribal property of the Nation's wards without
their consent." See also Nadeau v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 253 U.S. 442, 445-46 (1920)
Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 402-03 (1896).
64. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877).
65. An appropriation of Indian title to land has been held to be a taking protected by
the fifth amendment of the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Creek Nation, 295
U.S. 103, 110 (1935) ; Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919). In order
to be compensable, the possessory interest of the tribe must be one which is recognized
by treaty or statute. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
66. See Berger, Indian Lands-Minerals-Related Problems, 14 RocKy MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 89, 97.
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constituent elements of the land itself. '

17

Thus, subject to the para-

mount authority of the federal government, "[t]he right of perpetual
and exclusive occupancy of the land [held by a tribe] is not less valu6'
able than full title in fee."1

A unique legal relationship between the federal government and
the Indian tribes has arisen as a result of the dual interests existing
in reservation lands. The courts have characterized this relationship
as one of trustee-beneficiary or guardian-ward. In Seminole Nation
v. United States, the United States Supreme Court stated as follows:
[T]his Court has recognized the distinctive obligation of
trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with
these dependent and sometimes exploited people. .

.

.In car-

rying out its treaty. obligations with the Indian tribes, the
Government is something more than a mere contracting party. Under a humane and self imposed policy which has found
expression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions
of this Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations of
the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed
in the acts of those who represent it in dealings with the
Indians, should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.6 9

On the basis of this legal relationship, the courts have upheld congressional legislation that singles out Indians "for particular and special treatment,

' 70

and have also articulated a canon of construction

for treaties and federal statutes affecting the Indian tribes. The essence of this canon is that "[d]oubtful expressions [instead of being resolved in favor of the United States] are to be resolved in
favor of the weak and defenseless people who are wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith."' 7 1 It has thus

been held that provisions susceptible of more than one meaning
should be given their ordinary import, 72 and legislation passed subsequent to a particular treaty should be interpreted in harmony with
the plain purposes of the treaty.7 3 Because Indian tribes enjoy a fiduciary relationship with the United States, the courts have also
been reticent to apply general federal statutes to the reservations,
74
particularly where a treaty right would be infringed.
67. 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938).
68. Id. at 116.
69. 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (citations omitted).
70. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974). See also McClannahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S.
705 (1943).
71. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930). See also Antonie v. Washington, 420
U .S. 194, 200 (1975); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 390 U.S. 404 (1968) ;
Starr v. Long Jim. 227 U.S. 613, 622-23 (1913) ; Jones v. Meehan., 175 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1899).
72. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
73. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1939).
74. It has been held that Indian tribes are not to be included in general acts passed by
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Thus, there is a special relationship between the Indian tribes
and the federal government. The reservations are subject to the plenary power of the United States. While subject to this plenary power,
however, it has been the generally accepted practice of the federal
government and the courts to permit the Indians a large measure of
authority over their internal affairs.7 5 The basis of this practice is the
historical recognition of Indian tribes as quasi-sovereign states.
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers is marked by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first
instance, all of the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the
United States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into
treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself affect the
internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local selfgovernment. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by
treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as
thus expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty
are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted
organs of government.
A striking example of judicial emphasis upon the quasi-sovereign
status of the Indian tribes is found in the early case of Ex Parte
Crow Dog. 77 In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that
the murder of one Indian by another Indian within the boundaries
of a reservation was not within the jurisdiction of any court of the
United States, but fell within the judiciary powers of the tribal government.7 8 Under the Court's analysis, an Indian tribe is a distinct
political community, and as such, possesses the power to regulate
its domestic affairs. Federal treaties and statutes are to be considered only as limitations upon this power, rather than a direct source
'ofauthority. 79 Thus, under this view, subject to the ultimate control of
the federal government, the Indian tribes are free to govern themselves.
B.

THE MODERN CONCEPT OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Although modern decisions of the United States Supreme Court
recognize the existence of inherent tribal sovereignty over the reserCongress unless there is a specific intent to include them. United States v.
U.S. 278 (1909). For a discussion of general federal statutes as applied to
vations, see Israel, supra note 13.
75. Moo v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead ies.,
(1976) ; McClannahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973).
76. F. COHEN, supra note 60, at 123.
77. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
78. Id. at 571-72.
79. See Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge fRes., S.D., 231 F.2d

Celestine, 215
Indian reser425 U.S.

463

89, 98 (1956).

NOTES

vations, these decisions have tended to avoid any "platonic notions" 8 0 of inherent tribal powers, and instead, have focused upon
the intent of federal treaties and statutes: when resolving jurisdictional conflicts.8 1 The purpose of such an analysis is to ascertain the
extent to which Congress has preempted a field to the exclusion of
the tribal governments and the states. In these cases, the question
of federal preemption of any given area of tribal affairs has arisen
in the context of federal limitations placed upon the exercise of state
8 2
jurisdiction over the reservations.
In McClannahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, Justice Marshall succinctly articulated the Court's recent approach as follows:
"The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues of this suit, but because it
provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal
statutes must be read. ' ' 3 The Court in McClannahan was presented
with the question whether the State of Arizona could tax a tribal member's income derived from employment solely within the reservation.
In reaching its decision, the Court read the Navajo Treaty, 4 the Buck
Act,8 5 the Arizona Enabling Act 8 6 and other federal statutes to conclude that Arizona was without jurisdiction to tax reservation Indians. 7 The doctrine of Indian sovereignty was important to the
Court's analysis because the traditional congressional policy " 'of
leaving the Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply
rooted in the Nation's history.' ",88
This approach to the concept of federal preemption of tribal affairs arose from an earlier, but less successful attempt by the Court
to formulate a resolution of the question of whether a state could exercise its jurisdiction over an Indian Reservation. In the 1959 decision in
Williams v. Lee, the United States Supreme Court held that the State
of Arizona was without civil jurisdiction in a contract action between a
complainant non-Indian owner of a reservation store and two mem80. McClannahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
81. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) - Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Res., 425 US. 463 (1976) ; Fisher v.
Disrict Court of Mont., 424 U.S. 382 (1976); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544
(1975) ; McClannahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164. (1973); Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Kennerly v. District Court of Mont., 400
U.S. 423 (1971).
82. Id.
83. 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
84. 15 Stat. 667 (1868).
85. Pub. L. No. 80-279, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 641 (codified in 4 U.S.C. §§ 1-146 (1970)).
The Buck Act provides for state taxation of persons living in federal areas, but does not
apply to "any Indian not otherwise taxed," and thus denies to the states the opportunity
to tax Indians living on the reservations. Id. §'109.
86. Act of June 20, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-219, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557. State enabling acts
generally disclaim all right to state taxation of reservation land and the affairs conducted
within reservation boundaries. E.g., Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (admission
of Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota and Washington).
87. McClannahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 178-79 (1973).
88. Id. at 168, quoting Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945).
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bers of the Navajo Tribe. 9 The Arizona. Supreme Court had concluded that since there was no act of Congress expressly forbidding
jurisdiction, state courts would be free to litigate civil causes of action arising on the reservation. o The United States Supreme Court
:reached an opposite result based upon the premise that "absent governing acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the
state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them." 91 Although the Court in Williams noted that the federal government has consistently acted upon
the assumption that the states have no jurisdiction over the reservations, 92 the focal point of the Court's opinion was a balancing of interests between the state and the tribe. The outcome of this balancing approach would depend upon whether the application of state
law would interfere with the capability of the tribal governments to
perform the same function.9 3 Because of its balancing aspect, the
"infringement test" laid down in Williams did not present a definitive method for resolving jurisdictional conflicts. 94 The states and
the tribes were left with few guidelines to ascertain the circumstances
under which states would be free to assert their laws.
More recent decisions have followed the strong emphasis of the
federal intent of treaties and statutes utilized by the Court in McClannahan. In the case of Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota,95 for
example, the United States Supreme Court was confronted with the
question whether a state and county had the authority to levy a
personal property tax pursuant to Public Law 28096 on a mobile home
owned by an enrolled member of the Chippewa Tribe on the Leech
Lake Reservation. In formulating its decision, the Court examined
the face of Public Law 280, 9 7 the history of the Act contained in
89. 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
90. Williams v. Lee, 83 Ariz. 241, , 319 P.2d 998, 1001-02 (1958).
91. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). See also Utah & Northern Ry. v. Fisher,
116 U.S. 28 (1885).
92. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
93. Id.
94. For a general discussion of Villiams, see Indian Civil. Rights Task Force, Developinent of Tripartite Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 351 (1974); Lynaugh, Developing Theories of State Jurisdiction Over Indians: The Dominance of the Preemption Analysis, 38 MONT. L. REv. 63, 71 (1974).
95. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
96. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588.
97. The Supreme Court had to determine whether section 4 of Public Law 280, Act of
Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 82-280, ch. 505, § 4, 67 Stat. 588, extended any authority to
the State of Minnesota to impose a tax on property located within the Leech Lake Indian
Reservation. Section 4(a) of Public Law 280 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1970))
states in part as follows:
Each of the States listed . . . shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of
action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the
areas of Indian country listed . . . to the same extent that such State has
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such
state that are of general application to private persons or private property
shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have
elsewhere within the State....
Section 4(a) of Public Law 280 granted the State of Minnesota civil jurisdiction over all
Indian lands within the state except for the Red Lake Reservation.
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legislative hearings,"" and other acts passed by Congress during
the same period.9 9 The decision then incorporated these acts and
the legislative history with the traditional canon of construction in
favor of the Indian tribes, 100 to conclude that Congress had not manifested an intent to allow states to apply their tax laws to the reservations. 10 1 The doctrine of tribal sovereignty was important to this
analysis because of the historical role Congress has taken in protecting the tribes from attempts by the states to encroach upon the
functions of tribal governments and because of the continuing
efforts
10 2
of Congress to encourage stronger tribal self-government.
In summary, the United States Supreme Court in McCannahan
v. Arizona State Tax Commission'0 formulated an approach for resolving jurisdictional disputes among the federal government, the
states, and the tribes by relying upon an examination of federal
treaties and statutes. 10

4

This approach corresponds with traditional

Section 4(b) of Public Law 280 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1970)) states
as follows:
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to
any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by
the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by
the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such, property
in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or
with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon
the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership
or right to possession of such property or any interest therein.
98. The Court concluded that "[t]he primary concern of Congress in enacting Pub. L.
280 that emerges from its sparse legislative history was with the problem of lawlessness
on certain Indian reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal institutions for law
enforcement." Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373, 379 (1976). In formulating this conclusion, the Court examined HI.R. REP. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953)
and S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). These reports were in all material aspects identical. See also 99 Cong. Rec. 9962, 10782-84, 10928 (1953) ; Israel & Smithson,
Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and Economic Development, 49 N.D.L. REv. 26.,
291-93 (1973).
99. The same Congress that enacted Pub. L. 280 also passed a number of termination
acts, the intent of which were to destroy the status of certain reservations and to subject
the Indian residents to complete state civiland criminal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,Act of
Aug. 13, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-587, ch. 732, 68 Stat. 718 (termination of federal supervision over the Klamath Tribe) ; Act of Aug. 23, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-627, ch. 831, 68
Stat. 768 (termination of federal supervision over the Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of
Texas) ; Act of Sept. 1, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-762, ch. 1207, 68 Stat. 1099 (termination, of
federal supervision over the Paiute Indians of Utah). The Supreme Court in Bryan concluded that construing Pub. L. 280 in pari materia with these acts provided "cogent proof
that Congress knew well how to express its intent directly when that Intent was to subject reservation Indians to the fullsweep of state laws and state taxation." Bryan v.
Itasca County, Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373, 389 (1976). Thus, if Congress had intended to
grant to the states taxing powers under Pub. L. 280, it would have expressly so provided.
100. Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1976). For a discussion
of the judicial canon of construction, see text accompanying note 71 supra.
101. Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1976).
102. In recognition of the Indian tribes as distinct political communities endowed with
a wide variety of powers of self-government, the Supreme Court in Bryan stated as follows:
And -nothing in its [Pub. L. 280] legislative history remotely suggests that
Congress meant the Act's extension of civiljurisdiction to the States should
result in the undermining or destruction of such tribal governments as did
exist and a conversion of the affected tribes into littlemore than "private,
voluntary organizations," . . . -a possible result if tribal governments and
reservation Indians were subordinated to the fullpanoply of civilregulatory
powers, including taxation, of state and local governments.
Id. at 388, quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
103. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
104. For discussion of McClannahan, see text accompanying notes 83-88 supra.
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concepts of federal plenary power over Indian affairs and property,
and at the same time, gives credence to historical notions of the
residuary power of the tribes to direct substantiali control over their
internal affairs.
V.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT CONCERNING TRIBAL LEASING

Under McClannahanand subsequent United States Supreme Court
decisions,10 5 the approach utilized to determine appropriate exercise of state, tribal, and federal jurisdiction over the reservations
is the analysis of applicable federal law. Although these decisions
involved federal preemption of state jurisdiction over tribal affairs,
the dpproach utilized by the Supreme Court in McClannahan is applicable to federal preemption of a specific area of tribal government. 0 6
Thus, an investigation of the sovereign capability of tribes to initiate their own form of mineral development necessarily requires an
analysis of applicable federal law. Over the years, Congress has enacted a number of reservation leasing statutes. An examination of this
legislation and the reasons for which it was enacted should determine whether Congress occupies the field of tribal mineral development to the exclusion of independent tribal participation.
A.

FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING

GENERAL LEASING OF INDIAN

LANDS

General federal statutes governing Indian lands cover at least
two kinds of land tenure.1 0 7 The first kind of tenure is tribal, or "unallotted" land comprising the interest held in trust by the United
States Government for the benefit of tribal members communally. 10 8
t
105. E.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) ; Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, of the Flathead Res., 425 U.S. 4.63 (1976) ; Fisher V. District
Court of Mont., 424 U.S. 382 (1976) ; United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
106. The approach utilized in McClannahaan wouldl apply only to those situations In
which Congress has not expressly preempted an area of tribal self-government. Because
Congress has plenary power over tribal affairs, an existing tribal ordinance which directly
contradicts a federal statute would undoubtedly be held invalid. See, e.g., Blackfeet Tribe
of Blackfeet Indian Res. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 562 (D. Mont. 1973).
107. A third type of land tenure existent upon Indian reservations is the Interest In the
minerals retained by an Indian on land ceded to the United States Government for purposes of homesteading. For example, the Sarpy Creek mine located outside of the Crow
Reservation is operated on lands ceded by the Crow Tribe to the United States pursuant
to the Act of April 27, 1904, Pub. L. No. 58-183, ch. 1624, art. I, $3 Stat. 352, 353, but
to which the Crows retained the minerals in perpetuity.
108. 55 Interior Dec. 14, 50 (1934) states as follows:
The powers of an Indian tribe with respect to property derive from two
sources. In the first place, the tribe has all the rights and powers of a
property owner with respect to tribal property. In the second place, the
Indian tribe has, among its powers of sovereignty, the power to regulate the
use and disposition of individual property among its members.
The powers of an Indisn tribe over tribal property are no less absolute
than the powers of any landowner, save as restricted by general acts of
Congress restricting the alienation or leasing of tribal property, and particular acts of Congress designed to control the disposition of particular funds
or lands.
(citation omitted).
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Such land is subject to federal restrictions against alienation o9 or encumbrance," 0 and to be valid,, any lease of this land must be effectuated by the tribal council or other. appropriate tribal authority.'
Each tribal member has an ownership interest in unallotted land but
this interest cannot be devised or alienated.1 1

2

The interest terminates

when an Indian's name is removed from the tribal rolls. 1 3
The second kind of interest in land located on an Indian reservation is the "allotted" parcels held by the United States in trust for the
benefit of an individual Indian."

4

The interest held by an individual

Indian in his allotment is legally enforceable" 5 and federal restrictions on alienation or encumbrance usually apply for a term of
twenty-five years."16
The first general statute enacted by Congress for the leasing of
.Indian lands was the Act of February 28, 1891." 7 This statute permitted Indians to lease allotments for terms of three years for farming purposes and ten years for mining purposes if, "by reason of
age or other disability," they were unable to do so themselves." 8 The
Act also provided as follows for the general lease of tribal and individually owned land which had been purchased by the Indians:
109. Act of June 30, 1834, oh. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 729, 730 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 177
(1970)) states in part as follows:
That no purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title
or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention
entered into pursuant to the constitution....
In the opinion of the Attorney General of the United States the Act of June 30,
1834 is a comprehensive prohibition against alienation of any interest In tribal land without the consent of Congress.
Whatever the right or title may be, each of these tribes or nations is precluded, by the force and effect of the statute, from either alienating or
leasing any part of its reservation, or imparting any interest or claim in or
to the same, without the consent of the Government of the United States.
18 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 235, 237 (1885).
110. Act of June 30, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-4, ch. 4, § 18, 38 Stat. 77, 97 (codified in 25
U.S.C. § 85 (1970)) provides as follows:
No contract made with any Indian, where such contract relates to the
tribal funds or property in the hands of the United States, shall be valid,
nor shall any payment for services rendered in relation thereto be made
unless the consent of the United States has previously been given.
111. See, e.g., Act of May 11, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-506, ch. 198, 8 1, 52 Stat. 347, 347
(codified in 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1970)), which provides that Indian lands "may, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, .be leased for mining purposes, by authority of
the tribal council .... " See also Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, § 3, 26 Stat. 794, 195 (codified In 25 U.S.C.§ 397 (1970)) ; Act of May 29, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-158, ch. 210, 43 Stat.
24.4 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1970)).
112. 55 Interior Dec. 14, 51-52 (1934), quoting Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation & U.S.,
28 Ct. CI. 281,
(1893).
113. Id.
114. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388, 388 (current version in 25 U.S.C. §
331 (1970)). The federal policy of allotment is discussed at text accompanying notes
144-54 infra.
115. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1970) states as follows: "Upon, the approval of the allotments .. the
Secretary of the Interior... shall cause patents to issue therefor in the name of the allottees, which patents shall be of the legal effect.
See also Poafpybitty v. Skelfy Oil
Co., 390 U.S. 365, 371 (1968).
116. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1970). The President may in his discretion extend the period of
restrictions on alienation. 25 U.S.C. § 391 (1970).
117. Ch. 383, § 3, 26 Stat. 794, 795.
118. Id. provided in part as follows:
That whenever it shall appear to the Secretary of the Interior that, by reason
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[W]here lands are occupied by Indians who have bought
and paid for the same, and which lands are not needed for
farming or agricultural purposes, and are not desired for individual allotments, the same may be leased by authority
of the Council speaking for such Indians, for a period not to
exceed five years for grazing, or ten years for mining purposes in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions
as the agent in charge of such reservation may recommend,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 1 9
The Act of February 28, 1891, was extended by the Act of August 15, 1894, to include the leasing of surplus tribal lands. "[T]he
surplus lands of any tribe may be leased for farming purposes by
the council of such tribe under the same rules and regulations and
for the same term of years as is now allowed in the case of leases
' 1 20
for grazing purposes.
It was not until 1955 that Congress broadened the permissible purposes and duration of the general lease of both tribal and allotted
land, but in doing so Congress did not repeal any of the previous
statutes.121 The General Leasing Act of August 9, 1955, reads in part
as follows:
[Any restricted Indian lands, whether tribally or individually owned, may be leased by the Indian owners, with
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, for public, religious, educational, recreational, residential, or business purposes, including the development or utilization of natural resouces in connection with operations under -such leases, for
grazing purposes, and for those farming purposes which require the making of a substantial investment in the improvement of the land for the production of specialized crops as determined by said Secretary. All leases so granted shall be
for a term of not to exceed twenty-five years, excepting
leases for grazing purposes, which shall be for a term of

not to exceed ten years . ...

12

of age or other disability, any allottee . . . cannot personally and,with berLe-

fit to himself occupy or improve his allotment or any part thereof the same
may be leased upon such terms, regulations and conditions as shall be prescribed by such Secretary....
There was a general lack of interest in Indian leasing by either house of Congress.
The only issue of any controversy was whether each Indian should receive eighty or one
hundred and sixty acres. 21 CoNa. REC. 10705 (1890). For a general 'discussion of the
1891 leasing legislation, see D. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN
LANDS (1973 ed.).
119. Ch. 383, § 3, 26 Stat. 794, 795 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 397 (1970)).
120. Ch. 290, § 1, 28 Stat. 286, 305 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 402 (1970)).
121. Pub. L. No. 84-255, ch. 615, § 6, 69 Stat. 539, 540 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 415d
(1970)) states as follows: "Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to repeal any
authority to lease restricted Indian lands conferred by or pursuant to any other provision

of law."
122. Id. § 1, at 539 (current version in 25 U.S.C. § 415(a)

(1970), as amended). In the

opinion of the Solicitor General, Bureau of Indian Affairs, the statutory language authorizing tribal leases for "public, religious, educational, recreational, residential, or business

purposes, including the development or utilization of natural resources in connection with
operations under such leases," does not extend to the grant of mining or oil and gas
leases. Memo. Sol. M.-36327 (Jan. 19, 1956).

NOTES

Under all the general leasing statutes, tribal consent is required prior to secretarial approval. 12 3 These statutes provide the
means by which all Indian lands may be leased for irrigated farming,'124 grazing, or other business purposes.
B.

FEDERAL STATUTES

GOVERNING MINERAL LEASING

OF INDIAN

LANDS

The general leasing statute of 1891 also authorized the lease
of allotted lands and those "lands . occupied by Indians who have
bought and paid for the same
." for mining purposes. 125 The authority to lease for this purpose has been superseded or amplified by
piecemeal provisions in six subsequent major statutes. 2
1. Mineral Leasing of Allotted Lands
Present provisions controlling the leasing of allotted Indian lands
were enacted as part of the Indian Appropriation Act of March 3,
1909.127 The mining provisions of this statute provide as follows:
[A]ll lands allotted to Indians in severalty, except allotments
made to members of the Five Civilized Tribes and Osage Indians in Oklahoma, may by said allottee be leased for mining
purposes for any term of years as may be deemed advisable
,,128
by the Secretary of the Interior ....
Under this Act, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to make
all necessary rules and regulations to effectuate its provisions." 9 The
1909 Act presently controls all leases of allotted lands. It does not,
however, apply to leases negotiated by an allottee upon whose lands
123. See, e.g., Act of May 11, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-506, ch. 198, § 1, 52 Stat. 847, 847
(codified in 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1970)) ; Act of May 29, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-158, ch. 210,
43 Stat. 244 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1970)).
124. Act of July 3, 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-508, ch. 787, 43 Stat. 894 (codified in 25 U.S.C.
§ 402a (1970)) provides for leasing of irrigable tribal lands as follows :
[T]he unallotted Irrigable lands on any Indian reservation may be leased
for farming purposes for not to exceed ten years with the consent of the
tribal council, business committee, or other authorized representative of the

Indians, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior

125.

may prescribe.

Act of Feb. 28, 1591, ch. 383, § 3, 26 Stat. 794, 795 (codified ' n 25 U.S.C. § 397

(1970)).
126. The lease of tribal land is also covered by special statutes the terms of which apply to
only those reservations therein specified. For example, mining leases covering tribal land.

on the Ft. Peck and Blackfeet Reservations are made pursuant to the Act of Sept. 20,
1922, Pub. L. No. 67-313, ch. 347, 42 Stait. 857 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 400 (1970)),
which states as follows:
[L]ands reserved for school and agency purposes and all other unallotted
lands on the Ft. Peck and ]Blackfeet Indian Reservations, in the State of Montana, reserved from allotment or other disposition, may be leased for mining
purposes under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior.

127.

Pub. L. No. 60-316, ch.

(1970)).
128. Id.
129. Id.

263, 35 Stat.

See 25 C.F.R. Parts 174, 175 (1976).
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(current

version in 25

U.S.C.

§ .396
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all restrictions have been removed, because he is then an owner in
fee simple.
2.

Mineral Leasing of Tribal Lands

Authority for the lease of tribal and mining purposes contained
in the Act Df February 28, 1891,130 was first expanded by the Act of
June 30, 1919.131 This Act empowered the Secretary of the Interior
"to lease . . . any part of the unallotted lands within any Indian reservation within the States of Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, or
Wyoming . . .for the purpose.of mining for deposits of gold,
silver, copper, and other valuable, metaliferous minerals.
132

Under this Act, Indian consent to the lease terms was not required
and leases- were granted for a period of twenty years with a pref133
erential right -in the lessee to renew.
The next statute to expand mineral leasing of tribal lands was
enacted on May 29, 1924.134 This Act governed leases for oil and gas
purposes only, and under its terms the Secretary of the Interior, with
the consent of the tribal council, was authorized to sell leases at public auction, for a period not to exceed ten years and as long thereafter as oil or gas was produced in paying quantities. 13 5
Two statutes were passed in 1926 and 1927. The first cov-ered the lease of lands within a reservation used for school purposes,'1 36 and the second extended the 1891 general leasing act to cover oil and gas leases on unallotted lands within executive order res3
ervations.1 1
Although Congress attempted to unify 'the piecemeal tribal mineral leasing legislation in 1934 by enacting the Indian Reorganization Act, 138 unification was not successful until 1938.139 In that year,
130. Ch. 383- § 3, 26 Stat. 794, 795. For federal regulations applicable to leasing of
tribal lands for mining, see 25 C.F.R. Part 171 (1976).
131. Pub. L. No. 66-3, ch. 4, § 26, 41 Stat. 3, 31-34.
132. Id. § 26, 41 Stat. at 31-32.
133. Id. § 26, 41 Stat. at 32.
134. Pub. L. No. 68-158, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1970)).
135. Id.
136. Act of April 17, 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-133, ch. 156, 44 Stat. 300 (codified in 25 U.S.C.
§ 400a (1970)). This statute provided that under all such leases, a royalty of at least
one-eighth was reserved to the credit of the Indian tribe.
137. Act of Mar. 3, 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-702, ch. 299, § 1, 44 Stat. 1347 (codified In 25
U.S.C. §*398a (1970)) provides as follows:
[tU]nallotted lands within the limits of any reservation or withdrawal created
by Executive order for Indian purposes or for the use and occupancy of any
Indians or tribe may be leased for oil and gas mining purposes in accordance
with the provisions contained in the Act of May 29, 1924.
(citation omitted).
138. Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (current version in
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1970)).
139. So few Indian tribes adopted the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act that
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Congress passed the Omnibus Tribal Mineral Leasing Act which provides in relevant part as follows:
[H]ereafter unallotted lands within any Indian reservation or lands owned by any tribe, group or band of Indians under Federal jurisdiction, except those hereinafter specifically
exempted from the provisions of this Act, may, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, be leased for mining
purposes, by authority of the tribal council or other authorized
spokesmen for such Indians, for terms not to exceed ten
years and as long thereafter as minerals are produced in paying quanti-ties. 14 0
The provisions of this Act presently control mineral leasing of tribal
lands on most reservations. 14 1 Certain tribes such as the Crow, however, were exempted from its coverage. 1 42 Leases negotiated pursuant to the comprehensive provisions of the Omnibus Act are made
by the tribes with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior or the
43
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.1
C.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LEASING

The federal leasing policy of both tribal and allotted lands on the
Northern Great Plains has its roots in the General Allotment Act, otherwise known as the Dawes Act, passed by Congress in 1887.144 UnCongress sought to unify the piecemeal legislation by the Act of May 11, 1938, Pub. L.
No. 75-506, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347 (current version in 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1970)). See
letter from Charles West, Acting Secretary of the Interior, to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives (June 17, 1937) concerning unification of tribal leasing legislation.
140. Act of May 11, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-506, ch. 198, § 1, 52 Stat. 347, 347 (current
version in 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1970)).
141. Section 2 of the Omnibus Tribal Leasing Act preserves the right of tribes organized
under Sections 16 and 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act "to lease lands for mining purposes as therein provided and In accordance with the provisions of any constitution and
charter adopted pursuant to [that Act]." Id. § 2, 52 Stat. at 348 (current version in 25
U.S.C. § 396b (1970)). For a discussion of the Indian Reorganization. Act, see text accompanying notes 160-74 infra.
142. Id. § 6, 52 Stat. at 348 (current version in 25 U.S.C. § 396f (1970)). In 1959, Congress extended the provisions of the Omnibus Tribal Leasing Act to include leases made
by the Crow Tribe. Act of Sept. 16, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-283, 73 Stat. 565. Leases undertaken prior to the passage of the 1959 amendment were negotiated pursuant to the Act
of June 4, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-239, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751.
143. Pub. L. No. 75-506, ch. 198, §§ 4-5, 52 Stat. 347, 348 (current version In 25 U.S.C.
§§ 396d, 396e (1970)).
144. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388. Piecemeal special legislation was also
enacted by Congress providing for allotment of certain reservations subsequent to the
General Allotment Act of 1887. For example, Crow allotments were covered by the Act
of June 4, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-239, ch. 244, 41 Stat. 751, which provided for the allotment of 160 acres to each tribal member, the patents of which were issued in fee or in
trust for a period to be determined by the Secretary of the Interior. Under section 6 of
this Act, mineral rights to the allotments were reserved for the benefit of the tribe In
common for a period of fifty years after which the mineral interest would belong to the
individual allottee. Id. § 6, 41 Stat. at 753.
Northern Cheyenne allotments were made pursuant to the Act of June 3, 1926, Pub.
L. No. 69-330, ch. 459, 44 Stat. 690, which provided for individual parcels of 160 acres
to tribal members, the mineral rights to which were reserved, to the tribe for a period of
fifty years. In 1968, Congress amended the Northern Cheyenne Allotment Act of 1926, to
reserve the mineral rights of the reservation in perpetuity for the benefit of the tribe and
authorized leasing of the minerals pursuant to the Omnibus Tribal Leasing Act of 193,
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der the provisions of the Act, individual tribal members were given
a certain acreage of land, the amount depending upon the age and
status of the individual. 14 5 The General Allotment Act was intended,
in part, as an effort to force the Indians to become assimilated into white culture and to accept white farming practices. 146 The need
for assimilation was expressed by an Indian agent in 1877 as follows:
"As long as Indians live in villages they will retain
many of their old and injurious habits. Frequent feasts, community in food, 'heathen ceremonies and dances, constant visiting-these will continue as long as the people live together
in close neighborhoods and villages. . . . I trust that before
another year is ended they will generally be located upon individual lands or farms. From
that date will begin their real
' 147
and permanent progress.'
The supporters of allotment believed that individual ownership
would guarantee an enjoyment and security in the land which tribal
communal possession was not able to afford. 48 Restrictions placed
on alienability would safeguard this enjoyment, and at the same
149
time allow the allottees ample time to learn the duties of farming.
In reality, efforts to provide the Indians with an individual agricultural base fell far short of the objectives of assimilation. The Indians were generally slow to accept white farming practices and con1 50
tinued to live in grinding poverty.
The allotment system did have one large advantage. It opened
up large tracts of reservation lands not needed for allotments to
white settlement.
"[Allotment] will eventually open to settlement by white
men the large tracts of land now belonging to the reservations, but not used by the Indians. It will thus put the relations between the Indians and their white neighbors in the
western country upon a new basis, by gradually doing away
with the system uf large reservations, which has so frequently provoked those encroachments which in the past have led
to so much cruel injustice and -so many disasterous collisions.' 5'
Pub. L. No. 75-506, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347. Act of July 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-424, 82 Stat.
424.
145. Ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388, 388 (current version in 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1970)).
146. See generally, D. OTIS, supra note 118.
147. D. OTIS, supra note 118, at 9.
148. Id. at 13. The believers in allotment
were confident that if every Indian had his own strip of land, guaranteed by
a patent from the Government, he would enjoy a security which no tribal
possession could afford him. If the Indian's possession was further safeguarded by a restriction upon his right to sell it, they believed that the
system would be foolproof. ...
Id.
149. Id. at 12.
150. See generally D. OTIS, supra note 118, at 40-56.
151. Id. at 17, quoting REPORT OF THE SEC. OF THE INTERIOR, 1880, H.R. ExEc. Doc. No.
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Large tracts of the reservations were opened to white settlement as
a result of the allotment policy. From 1887 to 1934, tribal land holdings were reduced from 138 million acres to 48 million acres. 15 2 Not
only had tribal lands dwindled, but many of the allotments were no
longer in Indian hands. After restrictions were lifted, many allotments were sold to white owners for easy cash. 15 3 The Secretary of
the Interior was also forced to sell allotments to satisfy estates to
1 4
which there were countless heirs. 1
Just four years after the passage of the General Allotment Act,
Congress enacted the first general Indian land leasing legislation. 155
The rationale for leasing allotted lands for farming and mining purposes came from original supporters of the Allotment Act who argued that leasing of at least a portion of an individual parcel "would
bring the Indian the wherewithal to cultivate the rest. ' '" 6 The lease
of remaining allotted and surplus tribal lands for farming and mining
purposes was also favored by western business interests and white
settlers.
White men saw before them fertile Indian acres now in the
hands of individual owners. For the most part these Indian
owners were not active farmers who made the most of their
lands. On the other hand, they were always tractable in money matters and would be very willing to rent-if the Govern157
ment would let them.
Reservation Indian agents also benefited from the leasing of Indian
lands. The agent often would approve leases at less than their fair
rental value, and then collect the difference from the lessee. 15
Four conclusions result from the examination of the general and
mineral leasing legislation, and the examination of the congressional
intent of this legislation: (1) Congress has through piecemeal legislation, culminating in the Omnibus Tribal Mineral Leasing Act of
1938,1"9 formulated a comprehensive scheme for the leasing of the
1, part 5, 46th Cong., 3d Sess. 12 (serial 1959).
152. Kelly, Indian Adjustment and 'the History of Indian Affairs, 10 ARIz. L. REV. 559,
564 (1968).
153. Id.
154. Hearings on S. 2755 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934).
155. Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, 26 Stat. 794.
156. D. OTIS, supra note 118, at 107-08 (citation omitted).
157. Id. at 114.
158. D. OTIS, supra note 118, at 122-23, quoting REPORT OF THE INDIAN RIOHTS AsSOc.
58 (1900) states as follows:
The.leasing is usually encouraged by the agents or others having charge of
the Indians for profit only, since it can easily be made a source of considerable income. The would-be renter seeks the agent having charge of the
lands, makes an inferior offer of the rents of certain allotments, and agrees
to pay the agent a stipulated bonus if he will recommend[ that the lease be
made. Where many thousand acres are available for leasing, the income to
the agent from this source might many times exceed his salary.
159. Pub. L. No. 75-506, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347 (current version in 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g
(1970)).
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surface and mineral estates of the reservations; (2) Congress has in
the majority of these statutes expressly provided for tribal and individual consent prior to final negotiation of the leases; (3) in none
of these statutes has Congress specifically prohibited the tribes from
utilizing any other form of mineral development; and (4) federal
general and mineral leasing legislation covering all Indian lands
arose out of motives attendant to the general allotment policy.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT
A.

CORPORATE POWERS

In an attempt to remedy the devastating consequences of the allotment system, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 (IRA) ,160 The primary objective of this Act was to increase tribal control over reservation lands and to reduce much of the discretion over tribal affairs exercised by the Department of the Interior
and the Office of Indian Affairs.' 61 A foremost sponsor of the IRA,
Representative Howard, succinctly summarized its objectives in the

House debates on the final legislation as follows:
[This bill] seeks the functional and tribal organization of
the Indians so as to make the Indians the principle agents
in their own economic and racial salvation, and will progressively reduce and largely decentralize the powers of the Fed-

eral Indian Service.
In carrying out this program, the Indian Service will become the advisor of the Indians rather than their ruler. The
160. IRA, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (current version in 25 U.S.C. §§
461-79 (1970)). The IRA is entitled:
An Act [t]o conserve and develop Indian lands and resources; to extend to
Indians the right to form business and other organizations; to establish a
credit system for Indians; to grant certain rights of home rule to Indians;
to provide for vocational education, for Indians; and for other purposes.
The original legislation, H.R. 7902, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) and S. 2755, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), was known as the Wheeler-Howard Bill, and was introduced in
the House by Representative Howard on Feb. 12, 1934, 78 CONG. REC. 2437 (1934), and
in the Senate by Senator Wheeler on Feb. 13, 1934, 7S CoNc. REc. 2440 (1934). After
extensive debates, both houses approved the final version of S. 3645 on June 16, 1934. Id.
at 12001-04, 12161-65. The President approved the legislation on June 18, 1934. Id. at
12451. For an excellent discussion of the history of the IRA, see Comment, Tribal SelfGovernmen't and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 955 (1972).
161. In a memorandum submitted during Hearings on S. 2755 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Indinn Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1934), John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, provided an explanation of the Department of the Interior's projected role in implementing the IRA as follows:
[T]he bill does not abrogate to the Indian Office or to the Interior Department added power. On the contrary, the bill divests these offices of much
arbitrary power; makes them responsible to the Indians whom they serve,
and responsible with much greater detail than at present to the courts, and
to the Congress which has delegated to the Indian Office far too wide a discretion in the past. But the bill does vest in the Secretary of the Interior the
power of initiative, which must be an administrative power and which is
necessary if the Indian lands are to be salvaged and if Indian self-help,
through organized action by Indians, is to be forwarded.
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Federal Government will continue its guardianship of the Indians, but the guardianship envisaged by the new policy will
constantly strengthen the Indians, rather than weakening
them.162
Under the IRA provisions, the allotment of Indian land was discontinued,' 1 3 surplus lands within reservations were restored to tribal ownership, 164 and a federal revolving loan fund was provided for
tribes that wished to pursue economic development programs. 165 The
heart of the legislation, however, explicitly substantiated the power
of the tribes to organize a system of self-government. Under sections
16 and 17 of the IRA, the" tribes received the option of formulating
and adopting a constitution and municipal-type charter. Section 16
provides as follows:
Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation,
shall have the right to organize for its common welfare, and
may adopt an appropriate constitution and by laws, which
shall become effective ... at a special election authorized and
called by the Secretary of the Interior under such rules and
regulations as he may prescribe ...
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or
tribal council by existing law, the constitution adopted by said
tribe shall also vest in such tribe or its tribal council the
following rights and powers; To employ legal counsel, . . . to
prevent the safe, disposition, lease or encumbrance of tribal
lands, interest in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the Federal, State
and local Governments. .... 166
Section 17 of the IRA further substantiated these constitutional powers by the issuance of a charter of incorporation.
Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase, take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise own,
hold, manage, operate, and dispose of property of every description, real and personal, including the power to purchase
restricted Indian lands and to issue in exchange therefore
interests in corporate property, and such further powers as
may be incidental to the conduct of corporate business, not
inconsistent with law, but no authority shall be granted to
162. 78 CONG. REC. 11732 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Howard).
163. IRA § 1, 48 Stat. 984, 984 (codified i.n 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1970)), provides that "no
land of any Indian reservation, created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the
Indians, Act of Congress, Executive order, purchase, or otherwise, shall be allotted In
severalty to any Indian."
164. Id.
§ 3, 48 Stat. at 984 (current version in 25 U.S.C. § 4,63 (1970)), states as follows:
"The Secretary of the Interior... is hereby authorized to restore to tribal ownership the remaining surplus lands of any Indian reservation heretofore opened, or authorized to be
opened, to sale, or any other form of disposal by Presidential proclamation, or by any of
the public land laws of the United States ..
"
165. Id. § 10, 48 Stat. at 986 (current version in 25 U.S.C. § 470 (1970)).
166. Id. § 16, 48 Stat. at 987 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970)).
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sell, mortgage, or lease for a period exceeding ten years any
167
of the land included in the limits of the reservation...
The question whether such a charter would enable a tribe to incorporate for mining purposes was answered during the House debates on the legislation in its final form. 6 " Representative Howard
described the corporate purposes that the IRA would encompass as
follows:
Such a corporation may be a stock or nonstock corporation,
but in any event its shares or assets would be inalienable
outside the tribe. It is the purpose of this section to encourage Indian enterprise in agriculture, mining, lumbering, fishing, and other types of business, and to give tribes or groups
the necessary legal rights and powers to conduct such enterprises. 169
The question of the power of tribes to incorporate for mining purposes
was further addressed during the House debates concerning the coal
and asphalt bearing lands in Oklahoma. 7 0 During these hearings, it
was suggested that the provisions of the IRA would furnish the Chickasaw and Choctaw Tribes with the corporate vehicles necessary to
171
manage and operate their own mines.
B.

INHERENT TRIBAL POWERS OF INCORPORATION

Although the IRA authorized the tribes to establish a corporation
for mineral development, in order to utilize its powers a majority
of the adult Indians of any tribe had to adopt its provisions within
one year of congressional approval.17 2 The purpose of this limitation
was to prevent the Department of the Interior from imposing the
terms of the Act on the tribes without their consent. 7 3 The IRA did
167. Id. § 16, 48 Stat. at 988 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1970)). For a discussion of
the provisions of the Northern Cheyenne and the Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold corporate charters, see text accompanying Notes 49-52 supra.
168. See 78 CoNG. REac. 11731 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Howard).
169. 78 CONG. REc. 11731 (1934) (emphasis added) (remarks of Rep. Howard).
170. 78 OONG. REC. 9270 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Hastings).
171. Id.
172. IRA § 18, 48 Stat. 984, 988 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 478 (1970)) provides as
follows:
This Act shall not apply to any reservation wherein a majority of the adult
Indians, voting at a special election duly called by the Secretary of the Interior, shall vote against its application. It shall be the duty of the Secretary
of the Interior, within one year after the passage and approval of this Act,
to call such an election ...
The one year period for tribal elections was extended for one additional year by the Act
of June 15, 1935, ch. 260, § 2, 49 Stat. 378.
173. In a memorandum submitted during Hearings on S. 2755 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sesa. 22 (1934), John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, explained the purposes of the requirement of consent to the application of the Act's provisions as follows:
It is recognized that the unlimited and largely unreviewable exercise of administrative discretion by the Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of

Indian Affairs has been one of the chief sources of complaint on the part
of the Indians. It

is

the chief object of the

bill to terminate such bureau-
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not grant the tribes an option of receiving any new corporate authority, but merely substantiated pre-existing corporate powers held by
the tribes by reason of their inherent sovereignty. 174 In the words
of John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, during debates on
the Senate version of the legislation:
In large measure, the charters granted under this bill to Indian communities will be a recognition -of tribal powers
which Congress has never seen fit to abrogate, rather than a
grant of new powers. The right of an Indian tribe to deal
with many matters affecting the lives and property of its
members has repeatedly been upheld by the Federal courts;
the machinery for granting of charters should be used to
clarify and define the relations of an Indian tribe to its members, the status of existing tribal councils, and other similar
matters which are at present the subject of great confusion
both to the Indians and to the Indian Office ... 175
Among the tribes of the Northern Great Plains facing coal development, only two, the Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold and the
Northern Cheyenne, have voted to adopt the provisions of the IRA.176
These two tribes are therefore specifically endowed with powers of
incorporation. 1 77 Although the Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Peck and the
Crow Tribe did not vote to organize under the Act, these two tribes
are also endowed with inherent powers of incorporation. 178 The Decratic authority by transferring the administration of the Indian Service
to the Indian communities themselves. While the process of transfer is left
largely flexible, the Indians are given some measure of control ...
174. The purpose of the corporate provisions of the IRA was to clarify existing corporate
powers held by the tribes rather than create any new capability.
While the Act of June 18, 1934, had little or no effect upon the substantive
powers of tribal self-government vested in the various Indian tribes, it did
bring about the regularization of the procedures of tribal government and
a modification of the relations of the Interior Department to the activities
of tribal government....
F. COHEN, supra note 60, at 129-30.
175. Hearings on S. 2755 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934).
176. See CONST. & B3YLAWS OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FT. BERTHOLD RasERVATION, N.D., adopted May 15, 1936 and approved by the Sec. of the Interior, June 3,
1936; CORPORATE CHARTER OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FT. BERTHOLD RESERVATION,

N.D., ratified
Apr. 24, 1937; CONST. & BYLAWS OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE
TRIRE OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE INDIAN RESERVATION, MONT.,
adopted
Nov. 2, 1935 and

approved by the See. of the Interior, Nov. 23, 1935; CORPORATE CHARTER OF THE NORTHERN
CHEYENNE

TRIBE

OF THE

TONGUE RIVER RESERVATION,

MONT.,

ratified

Nov.

7,

1936.

For

a

discussion of the constitutions and corporate charters of each of these tribes, see text
accompanying notes 46-52 supra.

177.
178.

Id.
Act of June 15, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-147, ch. 260, § 4, 49 Stat. 378, 378

(current

version in 25 U.S.C. § 478b (1970)) provides as follows:
All laws, general and special, and all treaty provisions a.ffecting any Indian
reservation which has voted or may vote to exclude itself from the application of the Act of June 18, 1934 . . . shall be deemed to have been continuously effective as to such reservation, notwithstanding the passage of
said Act....
(citation omitted).
Although this provision does not address inherent tribal rights per se, it does Indicate that the IRA did not grant new powers to the reservation, but instead, nierely sub-

stantiated those laws and treaties already in existence.
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partment of the Interior has consistently recognized the inherent ability of a tribe to incorporate for economic development. In a memorandum concerning the ability of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe to
icharter corporations under its constitution, which was silent on the
matter, the Associate Solicitor quoted the Supreme Court decision
in McCulloch v. Maryland as follows:
"The power of creating a corporation, though appertaining to
sovereignty, is not, like the power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a great substantive
and independent power, which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a mea-ns of executing them.
It is never the end for which other powers are exercised,
but a means by which other objects are accomplished. No
contributions are made to charity for the sake of an incorporation, but a corporation is created to administer the charity; no seminary of learning is instituted, in order to be
incorporated, but the corporate character is conferred to subserve the purposes of education. No city was ever built, with
the sole object of being incorporated, but is incorporated as
affording the best means of being well governed. The power
of creating a corporation is never used for its own sake, but
for the purpose of effecting something else. No sufficient reason is, therefore, perceived, why it may not pass as incidental to those powers which are expressly
given, if it be a di' 1 79
rect mode of executing them."
Tribal powers of incorporation are thus inherent and incidental
to the express constitutional powers conferred upon any Indian tribe.
It was the intent of the IRA to- reaffirm these powers and to provide a vehicle for active tribal participation in the creation and adoption of a corporate entity.
VII. CONCLUSION
A review of the historical development of the federal leasing policy indicates that Congress has not expressly or implicitly prohibited
independent tribal initiative over its mineral resources. On the con179. United States Dep't of the Interior, Memorandum on Standing Rock Sioux Development Corp., M-36871 (Aug. 25, 1969), quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
315, 411 (1819). See letter from Martin P. Mangan, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to
Bureau of Indian Affairs Area Director, Billings, Mont. (Aug. 3, 1961), concerning the
inherent ability of the Crow tribe to delegate corporate functions by Res. No. 61-33 (Apr.
18, 1961), to the Crow Industrial Development Commission. The Commissioner of Indian
Affairs determined that the tribe could create a corporation by virtue of its status as a

governing body, pursuant to CONST. OF THE CROW TRIBAL COUNCIL, MONT. art. VII, § 6.
which provides as follows:

The Crow Tribal Council, which encompasses the entire membership of the
Crow Tribe, so far as the Crow people are concerned, shall be supreme in
determining by a majority vote of those attending, any course of action taken
which is designed, to protect Crow tribal interests.
See also 1d. art. VI, § S.

For a discussion of the present Crow tribal constitutional provisions governing the
creation of a tribal corporation, see text accompanying note 53 supra.

NOTES

trary, the federal government has encouraged the tribes to utilize
their powers of self-government, and Congress, through enactment
of the IRA, has recognized by statute the inherent power of the
tribes to utilize a corporate entity such as a coal authority for purposes of economic development. The federal government has also
consistently recognized the inherent powers of the tribes to create
corporate entities to further the economic basis of the reservations.
The constitutions and charters of the tribes of the Northern Great
Plains facilitate federal recognition of tribal powers of incorporation
by providing ample authority for the creation of a coal authority.
Although the burden of promoting a coal authority will be on the
tribes, this concept offers distinct advantages over the present leasing format encouraged by the federal government. This concept would
bring about more active tribal control and participation in the development of Indian coal and would promote a higher degree of economic return to these tribes than is currently derived from leasing.
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